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Abstract: 
The Great Recession emerged as an usual world macroeconomic imbalance, determined by an 
exchange rate volatility and severe setbacks in international trade, foreign direct investment and flow 
of labor force. As Western countries tackle their high fiscal deficit and public debt problems, they 
face historical levels of unemployment. That has made them constrain international immigration, both 
legal and illegal. Mexico has experienced in this context a fall in remittances as well as in the number 
of workers leaving for the USA. On the other hand, exchange rate volatility has affected purchasing 
power of the remittances´ recipient families, making them supposedly better off when the MXN 
depreciates. In order to estimate the net changes in purchasing power, incomes coming from 
remittances have to be matched with domestic prices, especially of those items which households 
consume the most.  
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Introduction 
Migration has been an important topic since the 90´s due to the increasing number of people 
moving around the world trying to escape poverty, climate change or political restrictions. In 
hindsight, present migration is still below the dimensions reached at the beginning of the XX century. 
Abramitzky (et al, April, 2012: 1) for instance, writes that the US absorbed 30 million immigrants 
between 1850 and 1913, and that by 1910, 22 percent of the US labor force was foreign born, 
compared with 17 percent today. Based on the results of several studies, the liberal British magazine 
The Economist (January 5th 2008: 16) concluded that, “if labour flowed without restrain, social and 
political systems would be disrupted on a huge scale, but global poverty would be vastly relieved”. 
The same magazine emphasized, “because immigrants see the world through more than one cultural 
lens, they often spot opportunities invisible to their monocultural neighbours” (The Economist, 
November 19th 2011).  Bo and S. Jacks (2012: 28) find also that migration has a powerful effect in 
economic growth and foreign trade. Furthermore, Alan Greenspan (2008) stated that migration also 
has a high potential to neutralize the economic setbacks derived from the aging population in the 
industrialized countries. However, the world economic crisis of 2007-2010, has unleashed a wave of 
protectionist policies that have restrained not only foreign direct investment (e.g. through 
expropriations and exclusion of strategic sectors),  but the free flow of merchandise and services, as 
well as the labor force. Mainly the United States of America and Western Europe have recently 
implemented several restrictions to stop illegal migration, which turns people into  criminals when 
entering their countries without permission. At the same time, this economic crisis has caused a 
volatility in the exchange rate market. Countries trying to offset the loss of competitiveness that 
appreciations bring with, interviene in the exchange rate market contribuiting to a currency war.  
Several economic actors who trade in foreign currency see themselves seriously affected by 
the nominal exchange rate (NER) volatility. A sudden appreciation of the NER makes exports less 
competitive but relieve debtors who can buy foreign currency cheaply. On the other hand, a 
depreciation can make a dent in debtors and importers budgets but it benefits exporters and families 
receiving remittances, since their income in terms of local currency increases. In this paper, we 
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analyzed whether or not households receiving remittances become better off in real terms by a 
currency depreciation. Thus we pose the following questions: to what extend does the economic crisis 
of 2009 affect remittances in Latin America? How has the USA confronted the problem of illegal 
immigration and what is the main cause of this policy? How have anti-immigration laws, the 
economic crisis and exchange rate affected the recipient families of remittances in Mexico? What 
have been the effects of exchange rates volatility in the purchasing power of families receiving 
remittances? To answer these questions we have divided our paper into four sections. Section I gives a 
snapshot of the consequences the Great Recession (Krugman, 2009; Stiglitzt, 2010) had in 
remittances flowing to Latin American and the Caribbean. Section II outlines the main changes in US 
immigration policy, especially the recent antiimmigration laws and their side effects in Mexico. In 
Section III we analyzed the importance of remittances in the Mexican economy and foreign exchange 
reserves, the correlation between NER volatility and remittances and the purchasing power of 
remittances in terms of food and fuel, taking as an example the price of tortillas and gasoline. In 
Section IV we explain what kind of strategies families depending on remittances  have implemented 
in order to offset an income drop caused by the Great Recession. Section V summarizes and draws the 
main conclusions of this analysis. 
Remittances in Latin America 
The 2009 economic crisis considerably affected several countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, mostly those for which the share of remittances amounts to more than 10% of their GDP 
like El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Haiti and Guyana. Haiti, for instance, received 2.1 
billion (bn) USD in 2010 an equivalent of more than 25% of its GDP. According to FOMIN (2009), 
the flow of remittances to Latin America diminished by 15% in 2009 as a consequence of the 
economic crisis. However, the depreciation of national currencies made it possible to increase the 
amount of remittances in terms of local currencies, counterbalancing the losses. Between 2002 and 
2008 remittances increased from 31.2 bn USD to 69.2 bn USD or by 17% (FOMIN). Other sources 
such as the BID, state that Latin American remittances went from 28 bn USD in 2002  to 64.9 bn 
USD in 2009 (MDZ). Because of the 2009 economic crisis, this amount dropped by 15%, descending 
from 69.2 bn USD to 58.8 bn USD. Also the number of transfers diminished from 15.3 money orders 
a year in average in 2008 to only 12 money orders during 2009. Of all the countries receiving 
remittances in Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico was the most affected in 2009 with a drop of 
16%. Central American Countries registered a contraction of 9%, whereas the Caribbean, the Andean 
Region and South America experienced setbacks between 11% and 12%, except in the case of Brazil 
where remittances fell by 20% due to the return of a great number of immigrants who were enticed by 
the Brazilian Economic boom, as well as the loss of opportunities in the host countries. The 
government of Japan for instance, refused to renew the working visa for Brasilian imimmigrants. The 
Brazilian workers who came back home, brought savings with, propping up the amount of remittances 
in 2011 to almost 2.1 bn USD.  It is worth mentioning that the main destinations of the majority of 
Latin American immigrants are The United States, Japan and Europe, especially Spain. Since those 
countries were affected by the crisis with a time span, the effects in remittances were, as well, 
different. Countries like Ecuador, for example, where remittances are distributed half and half 
between the United States and Spain, experienced a fall in money orders proceeding from the United 
States, but an increase by those coming from Spain.  
The economic crisis depleted an important number of jobs in sectors where imimmigrants are 
usually employed like construction and agriculture. Many imimmigrants who were laid off, looked for 
alternatives in other sectors like sales and service. Employment for Latinos decreased by 3.71% on 
average during the first three quarters of 2009. By August 2009, the unemployment rate among 
Latinos skyrocked to 13%. A poll directed by FOMIN shows that 25% of imimmigrants who had lost 
their jobs still sent money back home to their relatives. The same source states that in spite of the 
losses in employment, the average income of immigrants in the US didn´t change throughout 2009. It 
has been observed that the amount of money sent by imimmigrants has a seasonal behavior; it is 
usually higher during traditional festivities like Christmas and Mother´s Day; however, this amount 
also decreased by 15% in 2009. 
In 2011 remittances grew by 6% reaching 61 bn USD. Almost three-fourths of the regional 
remittances came from the United States and only 12% from Spain. This rebound can be attributed 
mostly to the economic recovery of the US economy, since the number of foreign workers in Spain 
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has diminished up 2009 by 2%. To begin with, this improvement in 2011 benefited Mexico and 
Central America which experienced an increment of 6.9% and 7% to reach 22.7 bn USD and 13.1 bn 
USD respectively. Secondly, Guatemala and El Salvador are the most important recipients with 4.3 bn 
USD and 3.6 bn USD respectively. Exchange rate variations benefited those countries which saw their 
currencies depreciate like Mexico whose remittances value in local currency increased by 17.5%. 
Countries like Brazil whose Real appreciated lost 15% of the value of remittances. 
US Economic crisis and Mexican immigration 
Illegal workers are the most vulnerable to economic crisis, but at the same time, they are the 
first to get back to work as soon as the economy rebounds. The construction sector, for instance, lost 
more than 600 000 jobs, downsizing the share of Mexicans from 25% to 17% in 4 years. Due to the 
recent economic recovery, the construction sector has reached the bottom line and has, ever since, 
begun to stir up again. Other waning sectors affecting Mexican workers have been tourism and 
entertainment as well as manufacturing with more than 100 000 and 150 000 fewer jobs between 2007 
and 2011. These workers have found opportunities in sectors like services, education, health, 
agriculture, fishing, and forestry and information technology. Mexicans of second and third 
generation have lost their jobs in construction and found new chances in the mentioned sectors as well 
as  entertainment and tourism. This phenomenon is not new; Hilary (et. al, March 2011: 21) states, for 
example, that the economic crisis in the USA from 70´s onward have particularly affected men, black 
and Hispanic workers. This is due to the fact that these groups are normally employed in highly 
cyclical industries such as construction and manufacturing. The already unusual 99 weeks long 
unemployment insurance benefit, represents an evidence that the US economy is facing a long-term 
unemployment problem. 
It is estimated that Mexican immigrants are concentrated in US States like California, Texas, 
Illinois, Arizona, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Washington New York, Colorado, Nevada, 
Oregon, New Mexico, Indiana and Tennessee. According to BBVA (junio de 2011), Mexican 
immigrants have left those US States where laws against illegal immigration have been issued. That is 
the case of the SB2040 in Florida approved on the May 3, 2011, by which authorities verify 
immigrant status of those who apply for public services or when detained by the local police because 
of a minor felony. If that person is illegal, he or she can be sent to the immigration office and be 
deported to her o his country of origin. This law was planned to be enforced on of July 1, 2011. In 
Indiana, the Congress approved the SB590 law on May 10 to be enforced by July 1, 2011, by which 
any person incurring a minor problem, even a traffic incident, can be arrested. Enterprises of this state 
working for the government will use an E-Verify system to monitor their associates and make sure 
they are not illegal immigrants. The governor of Georgia issued the HB87 law on May 13, which 
entitles the local police to check the migration status to anyone who breaks the state law, or punishes 
people who shelter or transport illegal immigrants. In Alabama a law was passed June 3 that allows 
the local police to stop any car or citizen suspicious to be an illegal immigrant; immigrant have 
therefore left Arizona, Florida and Georgia.  
Graph 1     Graph 2 
    
Source: BBVA (Junio de 2011).   Source: CONAPO (2012). 
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As we can see in graph 1, more than 140 000 immigrants left Florida, 70 000 Arizona and 40 
000 Georgia between 2007 and 2010. Many have moved to neighboring States like New Mexico, 
Texas and North Carolina. Other States like Oklahoma are discussing laws like the HB14462 by 
which any passenger travelling in a public or private transportation could be stopped to be asked 
about his or her immigrant status. Besides the fact that employers would have to verify the immigrant 
status of his associates, the state of Oklahoma could be entitle to confiscate any assets belonging to an 
illegal immigrant like cars, houses, money, etc. The State of Tennessee was discussing the HB1380 
law to be approved in 2012 by which anyone committing a crime or being suspected to be an illegal 
immigrant can be arrested.  
This policy has begun to affect Mexican immigration. According to Passel (et al, 2012: 9), 
deportations of unauthorized Mexican immigrants – some of them picked up at work sites or after 
being convicted for other criminal violations – have risen to record levels. In 2010, 282 000 illegal 
Mexican immigrants were deported to Mexico. The same source affirms that the number of Mexicans 
trying to cross the border illegally dropped from 1 million in 2005 to 286 000 in 2011. Border Patrol 
apprehensions are now to the 1971 levels. 
According to BBVA (Junio 2011), the growth of Mexican population in the US from 2002 to 
2005 was fostered mainly by an increasing number of immigrants, while the second half of the 00´s 
the children of Mexicans born in the USA led that growth. Passel (et al, 2012: 9) states that from 2000 
to 2010 births of Mexicans in US surpassed immigration as the main reason for growth in the 
Mexican-American population85.  The BBVA (Junio 2011) report reveals that 55% are men and 45% 
women; the share of immigrants younger than 30 years old has diminished, whereas that between 30 
and 64 years old has grown whereas the group over 64 has remained stable. The average age of 
immigrants grew by 3 years from 2000 to 2010 ending at 37 years old. The same source points out 
that Mexican immigration to the USA not only has diminished due to the economic crisis and the laws 
against illegal migration recently passed in the USA, but has unleashed a wave of Mexican returnees 
back home. It is estimated that from 2007 to 2011 the number of illegal Mexican immigrant has 
remained in 11.8 million. This information seems to coincide with Jeffrey Passel´s (et al, 2010: 11-15) 
report. He points out that the Mexican-born population grew 23% from 2000 to 2005, peaked in 2007 
at 12.6 million and stabilized for two years before declining slightly in 2010. In 2011, the Mexican 
born population in the U.S. decreased still further, to 12.0 million; 58% of them are estimated to have 
an illegal status. Passel (et al, 2010: 17) estimates that 5% to 35% of 1.4 million Mexican adults who 
returned back to Mexico between 2005 and 2010 may have been forced to do so, either by deportation 
or expedited removal processes.  An interview applied in 2010 showed that 20% of the repatriated 
Mexicans said they would never go back to the USA, while only 7% gave the same answer in 2005. 
He also writes, that the annual inflow of Mexican immigrants to the US went from 370 000 in 1991 to 
770 000 in 2000, but from that year on that number started to decline sharply to only 150 000 in 2009 
and even lower in 2010. He thinks that the return flow to Mexico might have exceeded the inflow 
from 2009 onwards. 
The number of household receiving remittances went from 692,676 in 1992 to 1,858,758 in 
2006, which equals a yearly average growth of 7.31%. Its share in the total Mexican households grew 
from 3.7% in 1992 to 4.7% in 2010, but it reached its highest participation in 2006 with 7%. That 
means, it dropped between 2006 and 2010 by -27%, going from 1.858 to 1.3 million or from 7% to 
4.7%. This fall can be explained by a higher number of Mexicans losing their jobs as a consequence 
of the economic crisis. According to BBVA the rate of unemployment among Mexicans went from 
5.5% in IIQ07 to 12.9% in IIQ09, while for the average American worker the same indicator was 
4.5% and 10% respectively. Conversely, the amount of remittances grew at an annual rate of 15.32% 
going from 3 bn USD in 1992 to 26 bn USD 2006. The steepest increments were scored in 2003 and 
2001 with 54% and 35.3% respectively and both were related with a US economic take off. 
The BBVA (Junio 2011: 25-29) report shows that the primary receivers of remittances are 
households living in rural areas. The Federal State of Zacatecas scored the highest in terms of 
receiving remittances in 2010, with 11%, followed by Michoacán, Nayarit, Guanajuato and Guerrero. 
At the same time, Zacatecas showed the highest share of households (17%) benefiting from foreign 
                                                          
85 Passel (et al, 2012: 35) states that Mexican born immigrants are younger, less educated and less likely to speak English 
very well in comparison with other foreign born residents of the USA. 
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money transfers, followed by, Michoacán, Nayarit and Jalisco. This same report found that more than 
50% of the households led by women and receiving remittances were in Tabasco (60%), Distrito 
Federal (52%), Tlaxcala (51.6%), Veracruz (50.9%) and Hidalgo (50.1%). The national average being 
45.0%, Durango, Campeche und Baja California showed the lowest share: 36.3%, 36.4% and 37.5% 
respectively. The same report states that these households don´t belong to the poorest levels classified 
as marginalized population, but to the low-income tenths. As a matter of fact, by plotting the 
percentage of households receiving remittances against the marginalization level, we observe an 
upside down “U” shape, meaning that as income increases the majority of these households receiving 
remittances are located in the middle levels of marginalization. However, there are families for whom 
remittances are of the highest importance and therefore, become vulnerable to external shocks. 
CONAPO (2010: 48), for example, states that the share of households depending on remittances for 
more than 75% of their whole income reached 16.5% out of 1.1 million households registered in 
1996. In 2006, when the number of families receiving remittances scored 1.9 million, this share was 
13.8%. In 2008 the proportion fell to only 6.3%. This significant drop is attributed to the fact that 
most of the families who stopped receiving remittances were those depending on them for more than 
75% of their income. Finally, it is important to emphasize that remittances make at least 50% of the 
whole rural households´ monetary income.  
Changes in remittances´ purchasing power  
Sources quoted at the beginning of this paper, posed the hypothesis that exchange rate 
depreciation had positive effects in purchasing power in terms of local currency and therefore, higher 
unemployment and a decline in remittances, were partly offset by a depreciation of the local currency, 
allowing the correspondent households to acquire more goods and services at the domestic market. 
According to the BBVA report (Marzo 1, 2012), Mexican remittances grew by 7.2% annually in 
January 2012, and twice as much in terms of pesos. The annual amount totaled 22.8 bn USD, which is 
2.2 bn USD above the level reached before 2007 and 3.2 bn USD below its highest record in 
December 2007. This rebound is explained by the fact that more than 50% of the jobs lost during the 
crisis in the USA have been recovered and 20% of them have been covered by Mexican immigrants.  
As we can see in the graphs 3 and 4, remittances have been growing along the 00´s, 
supporting the appreciation of the MXN through an increasing amount of foreign reserves. The 
Pearson correlation between foreign reserves and remittances equals 0.75 or a R2 of 0.57, which 
means they are highly correlated. According to the equation in bottom left side of graph 4, for every 
billion USD increase in remittances, the foreign reserves of Mexican Central Bank are augmented by 
2.5 billion USD. Conversely, the monthly amount of remittances in terms of MXN and the NER has a 
Pearson correlation of 0.87. A regression between the two variables states y = 594.9 + 276.7x,  which 
means that for every unit that the MXN depreciates against the USD, the average nominal value of 
remittances increases by 276.7 MXN as plotted in graphs 5 and 6. It is also evident that the economic 
crisis, which triggered a depreciation of the MXN by almost 40% at the end of 2009, increased the 
monthly average amount of remittances in terms of local currency. That also occurred at the end of 
2011, as we can see in graph 5. The 27% drop in the number of households receiving remittances 
between 2006 and 2010 was supposed to be counterbalanced by a more powerful dollar resulting from 
a depreciation of the NER. In order to see whether or not, these families obtained a better purchasing 
power, we must match that income with prices of products these families buy everyday. According to 
the Economist, (January 5th 2008: 11), 90% of remittances worldwide are spent on consumption. In 
Mexico, CONAPO (2010: 66) reports that more than 80% of remittances are used to buy food, pay 
rent or repair the house; only 6.5% are used to set up a business or to buy a property, and another 5% 
to pay debts.  
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Graph 3     Graph 4 
   
Source: Banxico (2011) Informe anual 2010. Source: Banxico (2011) Informe anual 2010. 
 
Graph 5     Graph 6 
   
Source: Banxico (2012) CE81 ingresos por remesas.   Source: Banxico (2012) CE81 ingresos por remesas. 
 
To conduct this analisis we have choosen two leading items of the Mexican basic 
consumption basket: energy (gasoline and Diesel) and Tortilla. According to the INEGI (julio de 
2011: 15) households´ income is composed by 75% cash and 25% in kind. For instance, food, 
beverage and tobacco represent 33% of the monetary expenditure, whereas transportation represents 
18.5%, making both together 50% of the expenditure. According to Irma Martinez (2003: 31), Tortilla 
appears in the first place among the 20 most important food products bought by an average Mexican 
family nation wide and it is essential to the poorest people´s diet. Eventhough both products, Tortilla 
and fuel, are heavily subsidized by the government86, they still represent a strong driving force by 
which prices of a great variety of products in the food chain and transportation change. Mexican 
Central Bank (Banxico, 2011: 38) acknowledges a high rate of inflation in food, beverage and 
                                                          
86 The total governmental expenditure to subsidize gasoline and Diesel from 2007 to 2011 was 530.23 bn MXN. In times 
where international oil prices are high, the subsidy increases, since more than 40% of the domestic consumption of gasoline 
must be imported. At the IQ12 the subsidy for gasoline and Diesel was 51.5 bn MXN, an amount that had already surpassed 
the whole budged for that year. So it is highly probable that energy domestic price increases continue in the future. The 
Secretary of Finance (SHCP) states that 50% of this subsidy benefits 20% of the population with high income, whereas only 
4% on the population with low income take advantage of this governmental aid (El Financiero, 2 de mayo de 2012: 3). 
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tobacco. This soared to almost 10% annually at the beginning of 2008 and went below 4% at the end 
of 2009 but rebounded again to reach more than 7% in December 2011. 
In 2008 and 2010 international prices of basic grains like wheat, rice and corn increased as a 
consequence of the food crisis. Prices of energy and precious metal soared as well; therefore, 
eventhough remittances increased in terms of MXN due to the depreciation, that did not mean the 
households could automatically acquire more goods and services. In order to gauge to what extend the 
depreciation of MXN meant a higher purchansing power for the respective households, we must 
match that income with price increases in Tortilla and gasoline.  Based on the average monthly 
amount of dollars87 sent by immigrants to their families in Mexico as plotted in graph 5, we can 
estimate the purchasing power in terms of food and energy. For instance, in graphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 we 
can see the behaviour of NER and the purchasing power of remittances in terms of Tortilla Kilograms 
(Kg), liters (L) of Magna gasoline, L of Premium gasoline and L of Diesel. In all items a depreciation 
of the NER seems to be reflected by substantial  loss of purchasing power, except during 2008-9 when 
the crisis struck the hardest. 
Graph 7     Graph 8 
   
Source: Banxico (2012) CE81 ingresos por remesas.                   Source: PEMEX, indicadores petroleros. 
 
From IVQ00 to IVQ11 the average monthly amount of remittances declined by -27.28% 
going from 409.61 USD to 297.85. At the same time NER depreciated from 9.57 MXN per USD to 
13.94 or by 45.66%. In terms of MXN this represented an increase of only 5.92%, going from 3920 
MXN to 4152 MXN in the same period. However the price of a Kg of Tortilla rose from 4.60 
MXN/Kg to 11.30 MXN/Kg or by 145%. Dividing the amount of remittances by Kilograms of 
Tortillas, we see a loss of 56% as shown on the left side of graph 11 since households could buy only 
367.4 Kg of Tortillas in IVQ11 instead of 835.8 Kg as they did in IVQ00 (see also graph 7). By 
extrapolating values, we can say that households could buy 631 L of Magna gasoline in IQ09 when 
the average NER was 14 MXN per USD, but at the IIQ11 they could only afford to buy 404 L, a loss 
of 36% (graphs 8 and 11). For Premiun and Diesel, households could buy 512 L and 729 L in IQ09 
and IIQ04, but 369.60 L and 389.53 L in IVQ10 and IIQ11 respectively, a loss of 27.8% and 46.5%. 
As shown in graph 11, the largest purchasing power loss these families had, was of Tortillas, followed 
by Diesel, Magna and Premium. 
Graph 9     Graph 10 
                                                          
87 The net amount is highly controvertible. But we use here data published by the Mexican Central Bank. CONAPO, (2010: 
51-52), for example, states that the average annual remittances amounts 2000.00 USD per family in the rural sector and 
2400.00 USD in the non rural sector. The same source specifies that the yearly amount of remittances in rural sector 
increased from 496 million USD in 1992 to 1,350 million USD in 2008, whereas non rural sector went from 968 million 
USD to 2,176 million USD in the same period. In year 2006, both sectors reached their highest level with 2,705 and 3,058 
million USD respectively. Finally, additional cuts resulting from commission charged by businesses like Western Unions 
must be considered as well. 
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Source: PEMEX, indicadores petroleros.  Source: PEMEX, indicadores petroleros. 
 
Table 1       Graph 11 
 
 
 
 
The items we have chosen are inversely correlated with the NER. That means that as the 
nominal exchange rate depreciates, purchasing power diminishes. Table 1 shows that Tortilla has the 
highest correlation with -0.60, followed by Diesel: -0.54; Premium:-0.26 and Magna -0.22 with their 
respective R2 :0.35, 0.3, 0.070 and 0.052. Supossing all money from remittances are used to buy these 
items separately, we can say that for every unit the MXN depreciates, households lost purchasing 
power in terms of 48 Kg of Tortillas , 50 L of Diesel, 10.8 L and 11 L of Magna.  This means that the 
largest price increases have taken place in Tortilla and Diesel. Apart from Tortilla, beans, white bread, 
chicken, tomato, sugar, milk and vegetable oil scored the highest price hikes between 2006 and 2011, 
affecting the purchasing power of the lowest levels of income. Diesel is used by a broad number of 
economic actors under which logistics and trucks have been most affected.  
On the other hand, graph 11 shows on its right side how a 36% depreciation of NER between 
IIQ08 and IQ09 allowed families to improve their purchasing power by 36% in Premium; 34% 
Magna, 30% Tortilla and 22% Diesel. But this windfall could not offset the losses accumulated 
between the highest and lowest purchasing power levels pointed out on the left side of the same 
graph, except for Premium with a net gain of 8.2%. This effect was the result of the fact that prices 
rose more rapidly than the purchasing power of the MXN derived from the NER long term 
depreciation, except for the period between IIQ08 and IQ09, when a severe depreciation came so 
unexpectedly that domestic prices could not catch up. 
 
Correlation NER vs Tortilla and fuel 
Item 
Time span 
Slope Pearson 
C. 
R2 
Tortilla 
00-11 
y = -47.941x + 1048.1 -0.60 0.35 
Magna 
02-11 
y = -11.07x + 657.87 -0.22 0.05 
Premium 
02-11 
y = -10.866x + 575.84 -0.26 0.07 
Diesel 
02-11 
y = -50.238x + 1172.4 -0.54 0.29 
Source: Own calculations with data of PEMEX 
Source: Own calculations with data of 
PEMEX. 
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There is still an aspect that could change the view of this analysis substantially. As we stated 
before, the number of households receiving remittances dropped by 27% going from 1.85 million in 
2006 to 1.35 million in 2010, while remittances on a yearly basis also fell, but only by 16% from 25.5 
bn USD to 21.3 bn USD in the same period. If we divide the amount of remittances by the smaller 
number of households, we come up with a higher amount of income per head. Graphs 12 and 13 show 
how a fewer number of households receiving a higher amount of remittances in terms of MXN due to 
the depreciation were able to buy more units of tortillas and fuel. Especially in the case of tortilla and 
diesel, where the aforementioned analysis showed a substantial loss, there is a clear betterment of the 
purchasing power from 2006 onwards. The recovery is stronger by Magna and Premium as graph 13 
shows. Calculating the monthly amount of remittances from this angle we come to a quiet different 
result. For instance, the average monthly amount88 rose from 408 USD (3,718.35 MXN) in 1998 to 
1322 USD (14,736.85 MXN) in 2008 and to 1308 USD (16,494 MXN) in 2010, which is a lot more 
than the statistics that the Mexican Central Bank and INEGI report. This is an open question that has 
still to be addressed since it might have to do with high levels of inequality or the participation of 
organized crime, both factors capable explaining why monthly remittances could be that high. 
Graph 12     Graph 13 
    
Source: Banxico and INEGI.   Source: Banxico and INEGI. 
 
Effects of remittances on employment and education 
If households receiving remittances had a real net loss either by a smaller amount of 
remittances; by an interruption of any help from abroad or by a deterioration of their purchasing 
power as the above analysis shows, they must have looked for alternatives to redeem these losses. 
According to CONAPO (2012: 45-47), the share of remittances in the total monetary income of the 
correspondent households soared from 44% in 1992 to 53% in 1996. The following years it dropped 
going from 40% to 48%, except in 2008 where it reached 27% due to the economic slump. But 
households seemed to have found ways to counterbalance variations in the flow of remittances. For 
example, the share of remittances in comparison with other sources of income (e.g. non monetary 
income; own business, and salaries) was 40% in 1996; 33.6%: 2006: and 21.2%: 2008, while the 
share of job retributions and revenues from their own business in the total income was 18.3%, 25.2%: 
1996; 29.5%, 9.8%: 2006 and 9.9%; 11.9% in 2008. This effect was even larger in the rural sector. 
That means that family members started to work or set up a business as they saw the flow of 
remittances languish. However, we must notice that none of them could fully substitute the 
importance that remittances had in 1996. Since some households could have stopped receiving 
remittances completly, we can observe a general deterioration of their standard of living. 
In this same context, a research conducted by BBVA (junio 2011:17-24) using the logit and 
probit models find a relationship between remittances and employment as well as remittances and 
school attendance. The results point out that the probability of a household finding a job reduces by 
between 7 and 8 percent if it gets money from abroad. This was observed in both genders, either male 
or female, running a household, but more intensively by those in which the responsible was a male. 
                                                          
88 Remittances in 2008 amounted 25.134 bn USD; households were 1.58 million, which means that every household 
received an average of 15 874 USD or an equivalent of 1322.88 USD monthly. 
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The same report states that between 2007-2010, the number of women belonging to these householdes 
and started to work, increased by 3%. CONAPO (2010: 59) states that the number of families led by 
women increased constantly along the 00s, and in 2006 there were almost 964 000; two years later 
and as a consequence of the economic crisis, this number was reduced to 738 000, which suggests that 
the most affected households were thouse led by women. On the other hand, BBVA (junio 2011:17-
24) states that municipalities with high rates of remittances reception show at the same time, high 
levels of unemployment. Two hypotheses attempt to explain the phenomenon; on the one hand, 
people receiving remittances are less motivated to work, making it easier for the rest to find a job and 
therefore showing sinking levels of unemployment; on the other hand, the smaller the number of 
people working, the less is produced and the less the labor force is required. 
In respect to the effect of remittances in school attendance, the same report found a positive 
relationship between remittances and school attendance among children below 15 years old and 
youths between 15 and 19 years old. Other estimates coincide with the results leading to the 
conclusion that remittances have fostered the formation of human capital, which at the same time 
constitutes a significant contribution to long-term development (Sachs, J.: 2005). However, an other 
important finding was that middle levels of education seem to foster immigration more intensively 
than higher ones.  Thus, the report concludes that education and reception of remittances have a 
positive correlation. That means that remittances allow and animate households to send children to 
school, opening them up a chance to immigrate when they reach the middle levels of education. That 
will assure, at the same time, the future reception of money from abroad. Recent data have shown that 
immigrants older than 15 living in the United States have an average of 9 years of school attendance. 
If this effect supersedes the former, the long term human capital formation in Mexico that remittances 
seem to foster could be counterbalanced through a brain drain process. However, this seems to be a 
world tendency; according to The Economist (5th June, 2008: 5), the Word Bank found that 32% of 52 
million immigrants in 2000, had a college education, a share which represented a sharp rise in 
comparison to a decade earlier. 
Conclusion 
On April 25th 2012, the Mexican President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, stated in a G-20 
Summit in Washington, that Mexican immigration to the USA had come to a halt in net terms, due to 
the fact that employment opportunities and health services in Mexico had substantially improved. 
That might be the case of Brazil, since our paper doe not seem to support the President´s declarations. 
The present analysis shows that immigration has indeed diminished through two mechanisms, by the 
drop  in the annual number of people leaving for the US and by an increasing the number of Mexican 
returnees. However, this drop is the consequence of the recent anti-imimmigrant laws and the Great 
Recession in the USA. Of course, other factors like the decline in Mexico´s birth rates and a slight 
economic improvement in some regions might have also played a role. But in general, the 
unemployment rate in Mexico has remained above 5% annually since the Great Recession broke up in 
2009; a level that is still very high when compared in length with the 1995 recession. If we take into 
account that 28.8% of the working population is employed in the informal sector, and more than 7 
million young people neither work nor study, it is hard to support the hypothesis that better labour 
conditions have stopped immigration in the last years. Immigration has diminished, but it is still an 
important alternative for many Mexicans to improve their income and help their families. It depends 
more on the USA economic performance than the dynamic of the domestic labour market. 
Remittances and immigration will eventually rebound as the US economy starts to overcome 
its present structural crisis. Remittances alone cannot be by themselves the main development factor, 
but they have proved to be until now a powerful driving force to deter or reduce poverty in Mexico. 
CONAPO (2011: 64) for example, points out that a 30% drop in remittances would condemn 30 000 
Mexican households to poverty. Those families for which remittances do not represent the main 
source of income normally strengthen their economic status by acquiring tangible assets like property 
and business. The present essay posed the hypothesis that NER depreciation translated to an increase 
in purchasing power in terms of local currency, which at the same time meant an improvement for 
families receiving USD from abroad. As we saw based on domestic price changes of Tortilla and fuel, 
the additional nominal income derived from such depreciation was offset by a larger domestic price 
increase, so that at the end, households became poorer. An additional factor which might have 
worsened the familie´s income was that remittances lowered in average and that several household 
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stopped receiving them  all together. An exception took place during 2008-9, where NER depreciation 
allowed families still benefiting from remittances to buy more units of Tortillas and fuel, as prices 
could not adjust so rapidly. 
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